LUCI Seminar Series 2024
Alessandra Marra (Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy)
Logical Norms as Defeasible Obligations
This talk develops a novel approach to the question of the normativity
of logic, which we reinterpret as a clash between two intuitions: the
direct normativity intuition and the unfeasibility intuition. The
standard response has been to dismiss the direct normativity intuition,
bridging logic and reasoning via principles that relativize the
normative import of logic to pragmatic and feasibility considerations.
We argue that the standard response is misguided. Building upon theories
of bounded rationality, our approach conceptualizes reasoning as
constrained by multiple, independent normative factors, logical and
non-logical ones. These different factors can conflict with one another,
to the effect that logically sound inferences might not coincide with
what is feasible for an agent to infer. From this perspective, we will
argue that logic gives us only prima facie, i.e., contributive and
defeasible, obligations on what to believe, but that such obligations do
not always coincide with what an agent ought to believe all things
considered. These distinctions will dissolve the alleged clash between
the direct normativity and the unfeasibility intuition.
This is joint work with Matteo De Benedetto (Ruhr U. Bochum).
The webinar will be held on Teams. To partecipate please write to Costanza Larese, PhD.
Everyone interested is welcome to attend.
The meeting will be held in English.
Participation is strongly recommended to students of the Doctoral School in Philosophy and Human Sciences and to students of the Doctoral School “The Human Mind and its Explanations: Language, Brain, and Reasoning”.